DePaul Law Review
Volume 57
Issue 1 Fall 2007

Article 5

Undue Deference: Toward a Dual System of Burdens under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
Jennifer M. Saba

Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review

Recommended Citation
Jennifer M. Saba, Undue Deference: Toward a Dual System of Burdens under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 57 DePaul L. Rev. 133 (2007)
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol57/iss1/5

This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Digital Commons@DePaul. It
has been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons@DePaul. For
more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu.

UNDUE DEFERENCE: TOWARD A DUAL SYSTEM OF
BURDENS UNDER THE INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT

INTRODUCTION

Partlow State School and Hospital ("Partlow"), located in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, was established in 19191 as a public institution designed to habilitate2 mentally retarded individuals. Its conditions were
notorious. Hospital staff regularly employed a number of restraining
methods-including placing patients in seclusion or under physical restraints-without orders from medical professionals.3 In one instance,
a resident remained confined in a straitjacket for the better part of
nine years. 4 At least four Partlow residents died due to "understaf'5
fing, lack of supervision, and brutality."
In 1971, family members of Partlow residents filed a class action
suit, alleging that Partlow was being operated in an unconstitutional
manner. 6 Finding for the plaintiffs, the court reasoned that, because
the constitutional justification for civil commitment of mentally disabled individuals is habilitation, those who are civilly committed must
be guaranteed individual habilitation in order to "lead a more useful
7
and meaningful life and to return to society."
When one considers the notion of overly-restrictive placements for
mentally disabled individuals, institutions like Partlow may come to
mind. Today, however, "wrenching debates" concerning the scope of
1. Ala. Dep't of Archives & History Tuscaloosa County, http://www.archives.state.al.us/
markers/ituscaloosa.html (last visited July 17, 2007).
2. In its decision on the constitutionality of the conditions at Partlow, the Fifth Circuit defined
"habilitate" as follows:
"Treatment" means care provided by mental health professionals that is adequate and
appropriate for the needs of the mentally impaired inmate. Treatment also encompasses a humane physical and psychological environment. The term "habilitation", as
used by the parties ... is a term used to describe that treatment which is appropriate to
the condition of the mental retardate.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1306 n.1 (5th Cir. 1974). The court went on to note that, even
incases where rehabilitation was impossible, habilitation was always intended to include care
beyond "the subsistence level custodial care that would be provided in a penitentiary." Id.
3. Id. at 1310-11.
4. Id. at 1311.
5. Id.
6. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 389 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
7. Id. at 390.
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individual services to be provided and the appropriateness of placements are common in special education conflicts. 8 The debate over
what constitutes inappropriate academic placement is much less transparent than in the days of Partlow, 9 though no less polarizing.
In 1975, Congress passed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 10 an effort to uniformly regulate the process
whereby disabled children receive special education services. In part,
the Act provides that every child must have access to a "free appropriate public education"' 1 and requires that parents be involved in deciding what constitutes "appropriate."' 12 Additionally, educational
placements must be minimally restrictive. 13 Thus, the Act presumes
that the placement that "maximizes education with children without
14
disabilities is favored."
Although IDEA is expansive, it fails to allocate the burden of proof
when disputes arise concerning its requirements. 15 In 2005, the U.S.
16
Supreme Court held that plaintiff-parents bear the burden of proof.
How the presumption and the burden allocation will coexist requires
8. Jamienne S. Studley, Foreward, Lawyers at the Education Crossroads, 31 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 1049, 1050 (1998).

9. Less transparent in the sense that the options at bar are generally not limited to institutionalization (on one end of the spectrum) and mainstreaming (on the other); as this Comment will
discuss, what is considered an appropriate education is much more nuanced.
10. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (Supp. 2005).
11. § 1412(a)(1).
12. IDEA places great emphasis on "the ability of the parent to understand their child's evaluation and placement, express their own view of an appropriate placement, and pursue their
procedural remedies in the case of disagreement." Christopher Thomas Leahy & Michael A.
Mugmon, Allocation of the Burden of Proof in Individuals With Disabilities Education Act Due
Process Challenges, 29 VT. L. REV. 951, 955 (2005) (citing Steven Marchese, Putting Square Pegs
into Round Holes: Mediation and the Rights of Children with Disabilities Under the IDEA, 53
RUTGERS L. REV. 333, 343 (2001)).

13. See generally Joshua Andrew Wolfe, A Search for the Best IDEA: Balancing the Conflicting Provisions of the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 55 VAND. L. Rev. 1627, 1638
(2002) (noting that the free and appropriate education requirement, which mandates that every
child receive individual educational services tailored to her unique needs, appears on its face to
conflict with the requirement that all special education students be mainstreamed to the maximum extent possible).
14. Mark C. Weber, Reflections on the New Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act, 58 FLA. L. Rev. 7, 41 (2006).
15. See Lascari v. Bd. of Educ. of Ramapo Indian Hills Reg'l High Sch. Dist., 560 A.2d 1180.
1187 (N.J. 1989). See also Leahy & Mugmon, supra note 12, at 956 n.26. ("In this paper, use of
the term 'burden of proof' encompasses the trial burdens of production and persuasion ...
Usually the same party bears both burdens.").
16. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005) ("We hold no more than we must to resolve the
case at hand: The burden of proof in an administrative hearing challenging an [individualized
education program] is properly placed upon the party seeking relief."). This Comment uses the
term plaintiff-parents, because parents are generally the party challenging an individualized education program at the trial court.
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further clarification and is the subject of this Comment. Part II discusses IDEA's statutory framework and Congress's intent, including a
detailed explanation of the Act's least restrictive environment provisions. 17 Part III argues that, in due process challenges to educational
placements, a strong presumption should exist that mainstreaming is
the most appropriate placement option. 18 Finally, Part IV asserts that,
without Supreme Court or congressional clarification of the presumption, statutory interpretation by lower courts may splinter, resulting in
undue deference to local school districts. 19 Moreover, minority stu20
dents may be over-identified as requiring special education services.
This Comment concludes by arguing for enforcement of a uniform
presumption that will simultaneously reduce confusion among lower
courts and allow for an appropriate level of deference to school
21
officials.
II.

BACKGROUND

This Part begins with a history of special education law, including a
discussion of the two cases that provided the foundation for IDEA's
adoption. 22 It then briefly contrasts IDEA as it was originally proposed 2 3 with the statute as it was adopted. Next, this Part highlights
important IDEA provisions, including the least restrictive environment requirement. 24 Finally, it discusses burden allocation under
IDEA both before and after the Supreme Court's decision in Schaffer
25
v. Weast.
A.

History of the Law

By the mid-twentieth century, public opinion shifted from the belief
that mentally ill citizens should be institutionalized to the belief that
26
habilitative intervention better served the State's moral obligation.
Post-World War II public policy "assumed the virtual abolition of
traditional mental hospitals and the creation in their place of commu17. See infra notes 22-114 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 115-183 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 184-200 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 201-208 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 209-211 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 26-43 and accompanying text.
23. As will be noted, IDEA had a different name in its original form.
24. See infra notes 44-84 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 85-114 and accompanying text.
26. See generally GERALD N. GROB, MENTAL HEALTH POLICY IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA,
http://mentalhealth.samhsa.gov/publications/allpubs/smaO1-3537/chapter2.asp
(last visited July
17, 2007).
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nity alternatives," which coincided with a steady increase over the
next two decades in community-based intervention to assist the men27
tally disabled.
Two district court decisions from the early 1970s provided the
framework for IDEA. 28 First, in Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Pennsylvania (PARC),29 the parents of thirteen disabled
children, along with the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children, sued the State among other parties. 30 Petitioners sought injunctions against several statutes that enabled the State to label children as
"uneducable and untrainable" and, thereby, temporarily or permanently excluded them from free public education and training programs.3 1 As evidenced in amici briefs, the scope of exclusion was
staggering. According to estimates by the State's 1965 Pennsylvania
Mental Retardation Plan, some seventy-thousand-to-eighty-thousand
mentally disabled children between the ages of five and twenty-one
were denied access "to any public education services in schools, home
or day care or other community facilities, or state residential
institutions. "32
Petitioners challenged the statutes on both due process and equal
protection grounds. As to the former, the statutes did not require
prior notice to parents before changes were made to education placements-even drastic changes, such as total exclusion from all publicly
funded education and job training programs. 33 Petitioners' equal pro27. Id.
28. See William D. White, Comment, Where to Place the Burden: Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act Administrative Due Process Hearings, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1013. 1015-16 (2006). On
December 27, 1971, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the following resolution: "The mentally retarded person has a right to proper medical care and physical therapy and
to such education, training, rehabilitation and guidance as will enable him to develop his ability
and maximum potential." Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 390-91 n.6 (M.D. Ala. 1972)
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
30. Id. at 281-82.
31. Id. at 282 n.3.
32. Id. at 296 (emphasis in original). Importantly, the PARC court carefully explained that
even disabled children who were receiving publicly-funded services were not necessarily guaranteed adequate services. Citing testimony by Dr. Edward R. Goldman, Commissioner of the
Department of Welfare's Office of Mental Retardation, the court noted that, at the time of its
opinion, 4,159 school-aged children were confined in state institutions. Of this number, 1,700
were in "partial but inadequate programs," and 3.259 had no access to educational or training
programs of any kind. Id. Moreover, as a result of "a lack of space, the State housed 900 mentally retarded persons at Dallas State Correction Institution, 3.462 at State mental hospitals, and
104 in Youth Development Centers." Id. at 297. Inclusion of this information indicates early
recognition by the judiciary of the gross inappropriateness of many educational placements prior
to IDEA.
33. Id. at 283.
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tection argument asserted that these laws "necessarily assume[d] that
certain retarded children [were] uneducable and untrainable" without
34
any rational basis.
The PARC court never decided the constitutional issues, because
the parties settled on a consent decree prior to its ruling. 3 5 Pursuant
to the decree, the State Attorney General reinterpreted the meaning
of the four challenged statutes to support the idea that every disabled
child had the right to a free appropriate public education 36 tailored to
her individual learning capacity. 3 7 This interpretation allowed the defendants to "effectuate this result [desired by petitioners] without conceding the unconstitutionality of the . . . statutes or upsetting the
existing statutory scheme. '38 The decree also stated that no disabled
child would be assigned to special education status without a due pro39
cess hearing.
4
Second, in Mills v. Board of Education of the Districtof Columbia,
the court held for the first time that denying publicly supported education to a learning-disabled child, while providing such education to
non-learning-disabled children, violates the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause. 4' The opinion brimmed with concern for equal
access to education. 42 "The final judgment of the court included requiring procedures similar to those that Congress later mandated in
the ...IDEA[,]" such as "notification of parents before special educational placement; independent, free disability evaluation; and a hearing before the board with the ability to present witnesses" in disputes
concerning special education services or general eligibility. 43 With
these two cases, the judiciary sent a strong message that the systematic
exclusion of disabled children from public education services was unconstitutional. Moreover, these decisions prompted Congress to respond by enacting a comprehensive federal law.
34. Id.
35. PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 285. See also White, supra note 28, at 1016.
36. The consent decree stipulated that "it [was] the Commonwealth's obligation to place each
mentally retarded child in a free, public program of education and training appropriate to the
child's capacity." PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 285 (emphasis omitted).
37. Id. at 285-86.
38. Id. at 285.
39. Id. at 284.
40. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
41. Id. at 875 ("[Tjhe defendants' conduct ... denying plaintiffs and their class not just an
equal publicly supported education but all publicly supported education while providing such
education to other children, is violative of the Due Process Clause."); U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
42. Indeed, much of the opinion borrowed language directly from the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also White, supra
note 28, at 1016.
43. White, supra note 28, at 1016.
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Statutory Framework

IDEA began with the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
of 1975 (EAHCA). 44 Congress passed EAHCA to address the
problems faced by disabled students in public schools and to protect
the rights of handicapped children and their parents. 45 Borrowing language from the PARC and Mills decisions, 46 the drafters evidenced a
belief that equal access to education constitutes a fundamental due
47
process right.
EAHCA underwent a series of amendments over the last three decades, including a name change in 1990 to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. 48 The current version of IDEA includes much
of EAHCA's original language, but adds terms such as "free appropriate public education" and "individualized education program. '49 Included in the original EAHCA-and largely left intact in subsequent
amendments-are three major requirements for education providers. 50 First, all states and school districts must provide a free appropriate public education to all children with disabilities. 5 1 In order to
determine what educational services are most appropriate, states and
school districts must locate, identify, and evaluate those children who
manifest learning disabilities. 52 Second, each child selected to receive
special services must have an individualized education program, which
articulates a plan for intervention and provision. 53 Finally, "[t]o the
maximum extent appropriate," schools must educate disabled children
54
alongside their non-disabled peers.
44.

See

RICHARD APLING & NANCY LEE JONES, THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDU-

Report RS20366) (updated Jan.
11, 2002), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/educ/files/ideaover.pdf. EAHCA was
passed as Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
45. See White, supra note 28, at 1017. Congress described EAHCA's purpose as follows:
"[T]o ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them ... a free appropriate
public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their
unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living." 20
U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(a) (Supp. 2005).
46. See White, supra note 28, at 1015-16.
47. See MARK C. WEBER ET AL., SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 287
(2004) "By calling the procedure the 'due process hearing,' the Act's drafters suggested that the
hearing rights the Act created were sufficient, and perhaps necessary, to satisfy the requirements
of the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause in the context of special education disputes."
Id. at 287.
48. See Pub L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103. 1141-42 (1990).
49. See White, supra note 28, at 1018.
50. See APLINO & JONES, supra note 44, at CRS-2.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
CATION Acr (IDEA): OVERVIEW OF MAJOR PROVISIONS (CRS
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IDEA provides federal funding to ensure that all disabled children
receive the free and appropriate public education articulated in
PARC, Mills, and their progeny.5 5 In 2005, IDEA mandated disbursement of special education services to over six million children
56
nationwide.
1.

Free Appropriate Education

IDEA is characterized by an "overarching requirement that all the
activities of the state be directed toward ensuring that '[a] free appropriate public education is available to all children with disabilities."' 57
The Supreme Court has characterized a free and appropriate public
education as "educational instruction specially designed to meet the
unique needs of the handicapped child, supported by such services as
are necessary to permit the child to benefit from the instruction. ' 58
Although a free and appropriate education is the most important concept in IDEA, the statute itself provides little guidance regarding min59
imum standards for compliance.
The Supreme Court endeavored to define the term in Board of Education v. Rowley. 60 Rowley concerned a deaf student who was officially classified as a special education student. 6 1 Although the school
and the child's parents agreed on many parts of the education plan,
they disagreed on whether an in-class sign language interpreter was
necessary. The case ultimately reached the Supreme Court. In an
opinion that continues to influence special education decisions, 62 the
55. Sharon C. Streett, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 19 U. ARK. LITrLE
ROCK L.J. 35, 35 (1996) ("As a condition of [receiving] the IDEA funding, each state must adopt
state procedures that implement the IDEA procedural framework at the state and local levels.").
56. Terry Jean Seligmann, Rowley Comes Home to Roost: Judicial Review of Autism Special
Education Disputes, 9 U.C. DAVIs J. Juv. L. & PoL'Y 217, 221 (2005).
57. Leahy & Mugmon, supra note 12, at 954 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2000)).
58. Id. (citing Rd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188 (1982)). As Leahy and Mugmon
noted, the specific guarantees of a free appropriate public education under IDEA generally include personalized instruction and support services to help the student achieve some parallel in
instruction to the grade levels of a regular education classroom and conformance with state
standards for public education, all at public expense. See Leahy & Mugmon, supra note 12, at
954 (quoting William N. Myhill, No FA PEfor Children with Disabilitiesin the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program: Time to Redefine a Free Appropriate Public Education, 89 IOWA L. REV.
1051, 1057 (2004)).
59. See generally White, supra note 28, at 1018.
60. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
61. Id. at 184.
62. Id. at 184-85; accord L.C. v. Utah State Bd. of Educ., 125 Fed. Appx. 252, 259 (10th Cir.
2005) ("We have made clear that we must be mindful of the Supreme Court's caution in Rowley
that the 'appropriate' education required by the Act is not one which is guaranteed to maximize
the child's potential.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Johnson v. Indep. Sch. Dist.,
921 F.2d 1022, 1028-29 (10th Cir. 1990); Evanston Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. v. Michael M., 356
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Court held that IDEA's scope was narrower than the plaintiffs
urged. 63 The Court first acknowledged that "the face of the statute
evince[d] a congressional intent to bring previously excluded handicapped children into the public education systems of the States and to
require the States to adopt procedures which would result in individualized consideration of and instruction for each child. '64 But the
Court also noted that any substantive standards for education were
conspicuously absent from IDEA and "ultimately construed the statute as primarily designed to provide [for] the availability of education
[to] disabled children, as opposed to guaranteeing a substantive level
of quality of education. ' 65 As one commentator noted, Rowley
"viewed [IDEA] as a law of process, and not one of outcome. '66
2.

Least Restrictive Environment Provisions

IDEA's cornerstone is that school districts must facilitate interaction between disabled students and their non-disabled peers. Indeed,
IDEA's legislative history is filled with evidence of "Congress' unquestioned desire to wrest from school officials their former unilateral
authority to determine . . . [educational] placement[s]," including
placements that constituted total exclusion from publicly funded education. 67 Accordingly, when a state provides for a disabled child's free
and appropriate public education, it must always focus on minimally
restrictive placement.
In 1999, the Department of Education (DOE) promulgated its final
amendments to the 1997 regulations. These amendments clarified
how school districts could comply with least restrictive environment
requirements. 68 They required that school districts provide a "continF.3d 798, 802 (7th Cir. 2004) ("As Rowley pointed out, courts lack the specialized knowledge to
resolve issues of educational policy. Once the school district has met the Rowley requirements, it
has done enough.")).
63. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 210.
64. Id. at 189 (emphasis in original). This line in the Court's opinion might lead the reader to
believe that the Supreme Court was going to side with the plaintiff-parents. In practice, the
Supreme Court has shown enormous deference to local education agencies in its school-related
decisions. For a prime example of this deference, see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329
(2003) ("We have long recognized that, given the important purpose of public education ...
[schools] occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.").
65. See White, supra note 28, at 1018 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 1020 (quoting Martin W. Bates, Free Appropriate Public Education Under the Individuals with DisabilitiesEducation Act: Requirements, Issues and Suggestions, 1994 BYU EDUC.

& L.J. 215, 217 (1994)).
67. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 321 (1988).
68. For a comprehensive list of DOE proposals. see Sarah E. Farley, Comment, Least Restrictive Environments:

Assessing Classroom Placement of Students With Disabilities Under the
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uum of alternative placement" options. 69 By continuum, the DOE intended that placements range from least restrictive-starting with
regular classes and slightly modified classes-to most restrictive7°
such as home instruction, hospital instruction, or institutionalization.
The regulations also require that schools place special education stu71
dents in the least restrictive setting appropriate on the continuum.
Under DOE standards, slightly modifying the classroom curriculum
for a disabled student does not render that environment
72
inappropriate.
Importantly, the regulations were not limited to the classroom. If a
school cannot include students in regular classes, it must include those
students in regular non-academic activities to the maximum extent
possible. 73 For instance, such inclusion could involve lunch or recess
periods with non-disabled students. Thus, the DOE's comprehensive
regulations indicate that "least restrictive environment involves not
only freedom from physical restraint, but [also] the freedom ... to
associate with ... family and with able-bodied peers. ' 74 Accordingly,
before a school can remove a child from a regular classroom setting, it
must offer the child "the full range of supplementary aids and services
that if provided would facilitate the student's placement in the regular
'75
classroom setting.
IDEA, 77 WASH. L. REV. 809, 817 (2002). Some of these regulations cited by Farley were issued
prior to 1999 but renumbered here.
69. Id. (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 300.551(b)(1) (1999)).
70. Id.
71. Id. (citing 34 C.F.R. § 300.551(a) (1999)).
72. Id. (citing 34 C.F.R. § 300.552(e) (1999)).
73. Id. at 817-18.
74. Sherri A.D. v. Kirby, 975 F.2d 193, 207 n.23 (5th Cir. 1992).
75. See Farley, supra note 68, at 818 (citing 34 C.F.R § 300 app. A (Question 1) (1999)).
Courts have developed different tests for determining whether the standard is met in placement
challenges. See Michael Hazelkorn, Reasonable v. Reasonableness: The Littlegeorge Standard,
182 WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. 655, 659-63 (2004). The Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have

adopted a test from Daniel R.R. v. State Board of Education, 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989), under
which a court must first determine "whether education in the regular classroom, with the use of
supplemental aids and services, can be achieved satisfactorily ...[and, if not] whether the school
has mainstreamed the child to the maximum extent appropriate." Id. at 1048. See Oberti v. Bd.
of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1215 (3d Cir. 1993); Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 695
(11th Cir. 1991) (opinion withdrawn in Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 956 F.2d 1025 (11th Cir.
1992) because of a question of jurisdiction; later reinstated in relevant part in Greer v. Rome
City Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 470 (11th Cir. 1992)). The Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have
applied the Roncker test, which states the following: "[W]here the segregated facility is considered superior, the court should determine whether the services which make that placement superior could be feasibly provided in a non-segregated setting. If they can, the placement in the
segregated school would be inappropriate under the Act." Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058,
1063 (6th Cir. 1983). See Devries v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876, 879 (4th Cir. 1989);
A.W.v. Nw. R-1 Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 163 (8th Cir. 1987). Finally, the Ninth Circuit ap-
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3. Parental Participationand ProceduralSafeguards
In part, Congress enacted IDEA to address the wholesale exclusion
76
of parents from special education service and placement decisions.
At the time of its enactment, "one of the main concerns of parents
was that school officials were making decisions about placing children
in special education, or refusing to do so, without giving the parents
enough opportunity to participate in these decisions that so deeply
affected their children's futures. ' 77 IDEA clearly defined channels
for parental participation in developing individualized education
78
programs.

proved a test that applies factors from both Daniel R.R. and Roncker. See Sacramento City
Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994). All three tests
include a number of different factors for judicial consideration.
76. See, e.g., § 1400(c)(5)(B) (Supp. 2005) (providing that IDEA's purpose is "strengthening
the role and responsibility of parents and ensuring that families of such children have meaningful
opportunities to participate in the education of their children at school and at home"); 20 U.S.C.
§ 1400(c)(8) ("Parents and schools should be given expanded opportunities to resolve their disagreements in positive and constructive ways.").
77. WEBER, supra note 47, at 287.
78. The central mechanism for enforcing the provision of a free appropriate public education
under IDEA is the individualized education program. Leahy & Mugmon, supra note 12, at
954-55. Leahy and Mugmon defined individualized education programs as "a written plan, created by a multi-disciplinary team, delineating a package of special educational and related services designed to meet the unique needs of a disabled child. The individualized education
program includes summaries of the child's abilities, outlines of educational goals, and specification of educational services to be provided." Id. IDEA requires states receiving federal funds to
develop an individualized education program for each disabled child in the district "and to implement the services specified therein within the least restrictive environment possible." Id. (citing Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 450 (4th Cir. 2004)). IDEA also provides for annual review
and authorizes certain revisions to the individualized education program. Leahy & Mugmon,
supra note 12, at 954, 955 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)(A) (2000)). The DOE calls the individualized education program the "cornerstone of special education." White, supra note 28, at
1021-22 (quoting OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUC. & REHABILITATIVE SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
A GUIDE TO THE INDIVIDUALIZED EDUCATION PROGRAM 16 (Lisa Kupper ed., 2000), available

at http://www.ed.gov/parents/needs/speced/iepguide/index.html). Individualized education program teams are comprised of parents and school educators who have expertise regarding the
child. The DOE's individualized education program guide lists ten steps in the proper execution
of such a program. Id. at 1022. These steps include the following, in chronological order:
[Ildentifying the disabled child evaluating the child; determining IDEA eligibility finding IDEA eligibility; scheduling an [individualized education program] team meeting;
holding the [individualized education program] meeting and drafting the [individualized education program]; providing the services required for the child by the [individualized education program]; measuring the child's progress and reporting to the parents;
periodically reviewing the [individualized education program]; and reevaluating the
child.
Id. When any step of this process breaks down, IDEA provides a number of administrative and
judicial remedies that an injured party may pursue.
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IDEA includes elaborate processes for notice and hearings. 79 Such
procedures were designed to "force . . . local school district[s] to justify a child's placement and educational program. 80° The processes
provide the following steps: (1) an aggrieved parent may file a formal
complaint; 8 1 (2) if dissatisfied with the school's response, the parent
may request an administrative review in front of an impartial hearing
officer; 82 and (3) as a last resort, the parent may initiate a civil action
in state or federal court, wherein the court may "grant such relief as it
determines is appropriate. ' 83 IDEA's due process component is
widely considered its most controversial feature and is frequently criticized by educators and legal commentators. 84
4.

Burden Allocation under IDEA Priorto Schaffer

Despite IDEA's elaborate provisions for notices, hearings, and the
guaranteed right to bring a civil action, it is silent on the issue of burden allocation. Before Schaffer, burden allocation questions were
largely controlled by two presumptions: (1) the Rowley presumption; 5 and (2) the least restrictive environment presumption embodied within the language of IDEA.86
As previously noted, the Rowley Court held that, in a due process
challenge, it is presumed that the program offered by the local school
district satisfies the requirement of a free and appropriate public education. 87 Because the services that the school district offered to the
79. WEBER, supra note 47, at 287.

80. Leahy & Mugmon, supra note 12, at 955 (quoting Marchese, supra note 12, at 343) (internal quotations omitted).
81. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) (2000)).
82. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)-(g) (2000)).
83. Id. at 956 (internal quotations omitted) (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(i)(2)(A),
1415(i)(2)(B)(iii) (2000)).
84. White, supra note 28, at 1014. In support of this statement, White cited Steven S.
Goldberg & Peter J. Kuriloff, Doing Away with Due Process: Seeking Alternative Dispute Resolution in Special Education, 42 WEST's EDuc. L. REP. 491 (1988). Goldberg and Kuriloff suggested that the due process model for dispute resolution in the special education setting is
ineffective, because parents generally have a greater emotional stake in the outcome than
schools. See id. at 491-96. Accordingly, procedural safeguards built into this model do little to
persuade parents that justice has been served. See id.
85. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982) (presuming that the program offered by
the local school district provided a free and appropriate public education).
86. The program that maximizes education with non-disabled students is favored. See Farley,
supra note 68.
87. Id.
[T]he provision that a reviewing court base its decision on the preponderance of the
evidence is by no means an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of
sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review. The
very importance which Congress has attached to compliance with certain procedures in
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child enabled her to advance from grade to grade with relative ease,
her individualized education program was appropriate. 88 The Court
reasoned that the standard for appropriate education was not that
which maximized the learning potential of children with disabilities. 89
Instead, the standard simply required meaningful access to public education-that is, some educational benefit. 90
Despite the guidance Rowley provided to lower courts, it did little
to explain how its presumption interacted with the mainstreaming presumption in cases where the two were at odds-for example, cases in
which a parent challenged her child's educational placement as overly
restrictive. To reconcile this ambiguity, many jurisdictions held that
the presumption favoring the school district did not govern where parents brought least restrictive environment claims. 91
Roncker v. Walter distinguished. between placement challenges and
all other challenges. 92 Roncker concerned the placement of a severely
mentally retarded child. 93 The state board and the child's parents
could not agree on educational placement. While the board recommended that he be placed in a class for severely mentally retarded
children supplemented by interaction with non-disabled children during lunch and other non-academic school activities, the parents
wanted him placed in a regular education classroom with special instruction. 94 Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit found in favor of the parents. 95 Citing a "strong [congressional] preference in favor of
mainstreaming," 96 the court distinguished Rowley by stating that,
the preparation of an [individualized education program] would be frustrated if a court
were permitted simply to set state decisions at nought. The fact that § 1415(e) requires
that the reviewing court receive the records of the state administrative proceedings
carries with it the implied requirement that due weight shall be given to these
proceedings.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This language clearly conveys the Rowley court's belief
that, except in egregious cases, courts are to defer to the judgment of educational officials.
88. Id. at 209-10.
89. Id. at 189-90.
90. Id. at 193-94, 200-01.
91. See, e.g., Devries v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876, 878 (4th Cir. 1989); Daniel R.R.
v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1989); A.W. v. Nw. R-1 Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d
158, 162 (8th Cir. 1987); Bd. of Educ., Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Holland, 786 F.
Supp. 874, 878 (E.D. Cal. 1992). For further support of this proposition, see Weber, supra note
14, at 41 (providing a useful overview of IDEA provisions that require "additional clarification"
from Congress and flagging burden of proof in least restrictive environment challenges as the
most ill-defined provision of the statute).
92. 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1983); see Weber, supra note 14.
93. 700 F.2d at 1060. The child had an IQ of less than fifty and was prone to seizures.
94. Id. at 1060-61.
95. Id. at 1063,
96. Id. at 1062-63.
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while that case involved only appropriate education requirements,
Roncker expressly involved the mainstreaming requirement. 97
Indeed, even before Rowley, dicta from various circuit court opinions suggested that courts afforded special status to placement challenges in IDEA hearings. In Oberti v. Board of Education, the Third
Circuit stated that, "when IDEA's mainstreaming requirement is specifically at issue, it is appropriate to place the burden of proving compliance with IDEA on the school. [Otherwise] the Act's strong
presumption in favor of mainstreaming would be turned on its
head." 98
Yet the Roncker approach was not universally accepted. 99 School
District of Wisconsin Dells v. Z.S. concerned the placement of an autistic child with abnormally aggressive tendencies. 00 After a series of
unsuccessful placements, the school district offered to pay for home
instruction supplemented by occupational therapy. 10 1 The child's
guardian opposed that placement option and requested placement in a
public education classroom supplemented by full-time aide supervision. 10 2 Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit adopted an approach that was
extremely deferential to local school district decisions, even in placement challenges. 0 3 As Weber noted, by "[i]gnoring cases . . . that
established that Rowley was not laying down a rule for least restrictive
environment cases, and [departing from] the court's own declaration
that the Act expresses a strong preference for mainstreaming ... the
court stated that reasonableness was the standard and declared the
school district's decision 'not unreasonable.' "04
5.

The Schaffer Decision

In Schaffer v. Weast, the Supreme Court further muddied the waters, holding that the burden of proof in a challenge to an existing
97. Id. at 1063. IDEA "does not require mainstreaming in every case but its requirement that
mainstreaming be provided to the maximum extent appropriate indicates a very strong congressional preference." While decisions about appropriate education require deference to the school
district's decisions, "[t]he perception that a segregated institution is academically superior for a
handicapped child may reflect no more than a basic disagreement with the mainstreaming concept. Such disagreement is not, of course, any basis for not following the Act's mandate." Id.
(emphasis in original).
98. 995 F.2d 1204, 1219 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
99. Weber, supra note 14, at 36.
100. 295 F.3d 671, 672 (7th Cir. 2002).
101. Id. at 673.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 675.
104. Weber, supra note 14, at 43 (quoting Z.S., 295 F.3d at 676 (holding that the "critical issue
• . . was whether the school administrators were unreasonable . . . in thinking it would be a
mistake to send Z.S. back to his regular public school") (citation omitted)).
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individualized education program rests squarely on the moving
party. 105 Initially, the hearing officer assigned the burden of proof to
the parents. 10 6 Despite the proffered testimony of doctors and disabil10 7
ity experts, the hearing was decided in favor of the school district.
On appeal, the District Court of Maryland reallocated the burden of
proof to the school district and remanded the case. 10 8 Considering the
same evidence from the initial hearing, the trial court found for the
parents.1 09 The school district appealed. 110 The Fourth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide which
party bears the burden of persuasion in an administrative hearing assessing the appropriateness of an individualized education plan.'
In affirming the Fourth Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court
t 2
looked first to the text of the statute, but found no guidance there."
Because the statute lacked express instructions regarding the burden
of proof, the Court relied upon the traditional presumption: plaintiffs
bear the burden of persuasion in evidentiary hearings. 13 Yet the
Court failed to address how its holding would impact challenges to
105. 546 U.S. 49, 49 (2005). Schaffer concerned Brian, a seventh grade student diagnosed with
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Id. at 54. He had attended a private school through
seventh grade, at which point school officials proposed placing Brian in a school that could
better accommodate his individual needs. Id. The school system determined that Brian was
eligible for special education services pursuant to IDEA. Id. Brian's parents opposed the
school's initial individualized education program proposal, which would have placed Brian in
one of two public middle schools. Id. They enrolled Brian in a private school that specialized in
instructing learning-disabled students, initiated a due process hearing challenging the initial individualized education program, and requested compensation for the cost of the private school
placement. Id. at 55.
106. Id. at 55. Schaffer concerned only the burden of persuasion, whereas the rest of this
Comment combines the burden of persuasion and the burden of production into the term burden of proof. For a breakdown of the delicate distinction between these two terms, see Fleming
James, Jr., Burdens of Proof,47 VA. L. REV. 51, 51-58 (1961) (reprinted in IRVING YOUNGER &
MICHAEL GOLDSMITH, PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE 811 (1984)).
107. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 55.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 55-56.
112. Id. at 56 ("When we are determining the burden of proof under a statutory cause of
action, the touchstone of our inquiry is, of course, the statute.").
113. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 56 ("The plain text of IDEA is silent on the allocation of the burden
of persuasion. We therefore begin with the ordinary default rule that plaintiffs bear the risk of
failing to prove their claims.") (citing MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337, at 949 (Edward W.

Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984)). The Court's opinion exemplified extraordinary deference to local
school districts. See id. at 59 ("Petitioners in effect ask this court to assume that every [individualized education plan] is invalid until the school district demonstrates that it is not. [IDEA] does
not support this conclusion. IDEA relies heavily upon the expertise of school districts to meet its
goals.") (emphasis added).
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educational placements in favor of mainstreaming where the pre14
sumption generally favors the challenging party."
III.

ANALYSIS

The Schaffer decision, a procedural reinforcement of Rowley's presumption in favor of deference to local school districts, has the potential to further erode IDEA's least restrictive environment
presumption in placement determinations. Such a result is inconsistent with legislative intent, general considerations of fairness and policy, and other remedial federal statutes.
This Part begins by discussing how true presumptions impact judicial decision-making." t5 It then provides an overview of the competing considerations underlying the least restrictive environment
presumption-individual achievement and normal peer associationultimately concluding that both goals are best achieved through mainstreaming. 116 Next, this Part discusses how courts have reduced this
presumption to a virtual nullity." t 7 It concludes that recent judicial
decisions are inconsistent with legislative intent and with general fairness considerations." 18
A.

ProceduralImplications of the Schaffer Decision

"The party with the obligation of persuading a judge" on an issue
bears the burden of proof.11 9 No uniform rule currently exists to
guide courts in allocation decisions; rather, such questions are considered on an ad hoc basis.1 20 Accordingly, allocating the burden of
proof to plaintiffs is a mere presumption. A party who is assigned the
burden of proof and is unable to persuade the judge of some fact will
lose. 1 21 In many special education cases, the evidence is equally bal114. See id. at 49-62.
115. See infra notes 119-123 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 124-142 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 143-150 and accompanying text.
118. See infra notes 151-183 and accompanying text.
119. Leahy & Mugmon, supra note 12, at 956 (citing Wilkins v. Am. Exp. Isbrandsten Lines,
Inc., 446 F.2d 480, 484 (2d Cir. 1971) ("Inherent in [our adversary] system is the general rule
that, as between two parties, he who desires to have judicial action taken in his behalf has the
burden of producing the evidence which is a prerequisite to such action.")).
120. Indeed, the ad hoc nature of allocation questions led the Minnesota Supreme Court to
conclude that, "[w]here the burden of proof should rest 'is merely a question of policy and fairness, based on experience in the different situations."' Rustad v. Great N. Ry., 142 N.W. 727,
728 (Minn. 1913) (quoting 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 2486 (3d ed. 1940)).
121. Leahy & Mugmon, supra note 12, at 956 (citing Leo P. Martinez, Tax Collection and
Populist Rhetoric: Shifting the Burden of Proof in Tax Cases, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 239, 244 (1988)).
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anced; thus, the burden of proof becomes the deciding factor. 122 To
the extent that the party who bears the burden of proof in such a
situation will lose, burden of proof allocation is critical.1 23 Accordingly, the Schaffer decision has far-reaching implications for special
education law. It should not control in least restrictive environment
cases in which the mainstreaming presumption justifies departure
from the default allocation rule.
B.

Maintaininga Presumption in Favor of Mainstreaming

As noted above, under IDEA's least restrictive environment provisions, "the presumption is that the program that maximizes education
with children without disabilities is favored. ' ' 124 True presumptions
provide the following evidentiary decision-making rule: if a party that
supports the presumption can introduce into evidence proof of B-the
basic fact-then the fact finder can conclude that P-the presumed
fact-is true.1 25 Inputting IDEA's requirements into the above
formula, one might assume that B represents the availability of placement in an educational setting alongside non-disabled students. Although there is no federal constitutional right to education in this
country, all state constitutions currently require public education systems.1 26 As to the second part of the rule, courts might infer that,
because the availability of mainstream public education is universal,
represented by B, placement in a mainstream classroom is appropriate
for all children, represented by P.
But, as legal commentators have noted, any attempt to reconcile the
relationship between the least restrictive environment presumption
and free and appropriate public education is much less formulaic. 12 7
Scholars and judges who endeavor to fashion such a formula ask,
"[d]oes appropriateness drive placement, or is placement the starting
122. Thomas A. Mayes et al., Allocating the Burden of Proofin Administrative and Judicial
Proceedings Under the Individuals With DisabilitiesEducation Act, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 27, 29

(2005).
123. Id. at 29-30.
124. Weber, supra note 14, at 41.
125. See Ronald J. Allen & Craig R. Callen, Teaching "Bloody Instructions": Civil Presumptions and the Lessons of Isomorphism, 21 Q.L.R. 933, 934 (2003). For an overview of the continuum of evidentiary weight courts may attach to a presumption, see Harris v. Israel, 515 F. Supp.
568, 570-71 (E.D. Wis. 1981).
126. Michelle R. Holleman, Comment, All Children Can Learn: Providing Equal Educational
Opportunitiesfor Migrant Students, 4 THE SCHOLAR: ST. MARY'S L. REV. ON MINORITY ISSUES
113, 116 (2001).
127. Jean B. Crockett, The Least Restrictive Environment and the 1997 IDEA Amendments
and Federal Regulations, 28 J.L. & EDuc. 543, 562 (1999).
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point for any consideration of an appropriate education?"1 28 Two
competing social values appear to drive IDEA's least restrictive environment focus: (1) "the individual rights of association"; and (2) the
desire that a student be placed in an environment that will maximize
her individual learning capabilities and amount of social interaction. 129 When these two rights collide, a number of questions arise
that require careful consideration by an individualized education program team. 130 What constitutes restrictive? Further, is restrictive a
relative term, necessarily defined on a case-by-case basis? Moreover,
will mainstreaming in the present lead to greater need for restriction
in the future? 13' "Presumptively, . . .segregating placement is more
harmful than regular school placement.... [But] when it is shown that
such a placement is necessary for appropriate education purposes in
order to satisfy the individual's interests or valid state purposes.., the
1 32
presumption [is] overcome."'
Yet recent research on mainstreaming indicates that these two
goals-individual achievement and normal association with peersare rarely mutually exclusive. 133 Such data establish a clear trend toward improved academic, social, and behavioral interactions among
disabled students and their non-disabled peers. 134 The academic benefits of mainstreaming are profound. Since the enactment of IDEA,
students with disabilities are more likely to graduate and more likely
to attend college or find gainful employment. 135 In fact, graduation
rates of disabled students increased by 14% between 1984 and 1997.136
Studies also show that special education students who are mainstreamed develop better social behaviors through interaction with students in the general population.1 37 The benefits that non-disabled
students receive from mainstreaming are equally noteworthy. Main128. Id. at 545 (quoting LAWRENCE M. SIEGEL, LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT:
PARADOX OF INCLUSION 134 (1994)).

THE

129. Id. at 546.
.130.

Id. at 562.

131. Id.
132. Id. at 546 (quoting H. RUTHERFORD TURNBULL III, FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION:

THE LAW AND CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES

133. See, e.g.,

163 (3d ed. 1990)).

NAT'L RESEARCH CTR. ON LEARNING DISABILITIES, TWENTY-FIvE YEARS OF

PROGRESS IN EDUCATING CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES THROUGH IDEA, http://www.nrcld.

org/resources/osep/historyidea.pdf (last visited July 17, 2007).
134. Id.
135. NAT'L RESEARCH CTR. ON LEARNING DISABILITIES, supra note 133.

136. Id.
137. LYNN NEWMAN, FACTS FROM NLTS2 (July 2006), available at http://ies.ed.gov/ncser/pdf/

20063001.pdf.
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streaming promotes awareness of differences and increased comfort
1 38
with disabled students, rather than stigmatization and phobia.
Even teachers benefit from the additional support provided by collaborative planning and from the additional instruction that regular
education students provide to their disabled peers in an inclusive educational setting. Students in general education programs can help reinforce appropriate behavior by example and through normal peer
interactions. 139 In terms of academic achievement, peer instruction is
sometimes more effective than teacher instruction, particularly where
the disabled student feels more comfortable with his peers than with
an adult. 140 For example, the film Educating Peter portrayed the regular education classroom experience of Peter, a third-grader with
Down's Syndrome. 14 1 In one scene, the teacher and her students
brainstormed about how to respond to Peter's outbursts, how to rein142
force positive behavior, and how to handle negative behavior.
Assuming that IDEA supports a clear-cut presumption that mainstreaming is the most appropriate educational placement for children
with disabilities, what quantum of proof must a proponent of an alter143
native placement furnish in order to overcome that presumption?
As evidenced by presumptions in civil proceedings, the potential exists for remarkable variation among jurisdictions. In will contests, for
example, a presumption of undue influence can sometimes attach
144
to the proceedings through the introduction of certain evidence.
Until 2002, a party seeking enforcement of a will in Florida
was only required to provide a reasonable explanation for testamentory favors to rebut this presumption. 45 In Arkansas, for example, the same party must proffer evidence to establish proof beyond
138. Id.
139. See HEATHER DORN, EFFECTS OF INCLUSION ON CHILDREN WITH SPECIAL NEEDS AND
THEIR PEERS, http://www.uwsp.edu[Education/pshaw/Portfolios/Heather%20Dorn/BlockI205/
inclusion.htm (last visited July 17, 2007).
140. Id.
141. Id.: EDUCATING PETER (Ambrose Video Publ'g 1992).
142. DORN, supra note 139.

143. The ambiguous use of the word "proponent" is intentional. In some cases, a parent is the
party who advocates a more restrictive placement and is charged with rebutting the presumption
of mainstreaming.
144. See, e.g., In re Urich's Estate, 242 P.2d 204, 211-13 (Or. 1952) (considering a variety of
facts, including the involvement of the will's proponent in the drafting of the will and the testator's mental infirmity, in finding a presumption of undue influence).
145. See EUNICE L. Ross & THOMAS J. REED, WILL CONTESTS § 7:11 (2007) (explaining that,
in 2002, the Florida General Assembly passed a law superseding the prior case law on the undue
influence presumption). This amendment was first interpreted in Hack v. Janes, 878 So. 2d 440
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).

2007]

BURDENS AND PRESUMPTIONS UNDER IDEA

151

a reasonable doubt that no undue influence occurred. 1 46 Between
these two ends of the spectrum lie a variety of possible quanta of
evidence.

47

The quantum of evidence question in least restrictive environment
challenges is similarly imprecise. The Z.S. case shows that at least one
jurisdiction allows a mere showing of reasonableness by the school
district to outweigh the presumption. 48 Given the Court's historic
deference to the wisdom of school administrators and educators,' 4 9 a
reasonableness standard will reduce the least restrictive environment
presumption to a virtual nullity. This result surely cannot represent
the intent of IDEA's drafters. As Weber noted, "if Congress wants
the presumption taken seriously, it needs to clarify that the presumption applies so as to overcome any contrary rule of deference to
school district decisionmaking. '150 Resolution of this issue is necessary for IDEA's continued effectiveness. Its policy preference appears to favor mainstreaming. Accordingly, only a presumption
applied with some teeth can give full effect to Congress's intent in
drafting IDEA.
C.

Analogy to Other Remedial Federal Statutes

In addition to the academic benefits afforded special education and
regular education students, the mainstreaming presumption is consistent with congressional intent in other areas of law. A general emphasis on integration is reflected in a number of federal statutes
pertaining to disabled populations. This trend reflects congressional
146. See Pyle v. Sayers, 39 S.W.3d 774, 777-78 (Ark. 2001).
147. A sampling of how different jurisdictions handle the presumption of undue influence in
contested will cases is illustrative. Florida and Vermont require the proponent to rebut presumed undue influence by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Diaz v. Ashworth, No.
3D06-2150, 2007 WL 1484550, at *3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. May 23, 2007); In re Estate of Roche,
736 A.2d 777, 779 (Vt. 1999). Tennessee requires the proponent to rebut presumed undue influence by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Matlock v. Simpson, 902 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Tenn.
1995).
148. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Eckmann v. Bd. of Educ. of Hawthorn Sch. Dist. No. 17, 636 F. Supp. 1214, 1225
(N.D. Ill. 1986) ("It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decisions of school administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion.... [Our] system of
public education ... relies necessarily upon the discretion and judgment of school administrators
and school board members."); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995)
(holding that teachers and administrators, who stand in loco parentis over students, enjoy broad
discretion in promulgating policies to protect the health and welfare of the students and may
adopt policies that, in other settings, would be unconstitutional); see also supra note 64 and
accompanying text.
150. Weber, supra note 14, at 43.
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intent. 15 1 As noted by William D. White in his article on burden allocation under IDEA, "the logical comparison of the IDEA to other
federal remedial statutes is ...informative. IDEA is best viewed as
similar to other remedial federal statutes,152such as Title II or the
[Americans with Disabilities Act] (ADA)."'
For instance, under the ADA, 15 3 an employee bears the initial burden of showing that an accommodation of the employee's disability
would allow the employee to remain in a normal work environment. 154 The burden then shifts to the employer to show that the proposed accommodation constitutes an undue hardship. 155 The policy
preferences behind such a burden allocation are clear: Congress enacted the ADA to rectify wholesale exclusion of disabled Americans
from gainful employment opportunities. 156 Disabled Americans are a
"discrete and insular minority" who have faced discriminatory employment practices and need federal protection in order to gain access
into the workforce.157 The burden allocation in employment discrimination cases reflects a preference that, whenever possible, employers
should not marginalize disabled employees, but should accommodate
58
them.1
Statutes such as the ADA suggest that parents should bear the initial burden of proving that their children are disabled and qualified for
services under IDEA. 159 If a school district then resists placement in a
mainstreamed classroom with reasonable accommodations, the burden should shift to the local school district to show why such accommodations are not possible. IDEA, like the ADA, intends to
reintegrate a historically marginalized group into society. Eliminating
151. White, supra note 28, at 1037-38.
152. Id. at 1045.
153. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
154. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
SONABLE ACCOMMODATION
TIES

OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, ENFORCEMENT

GUIDANCE:

REA-

AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILI-

ACT (2002), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html

(last visited July 17,

2007).
155. Id.

156. Id.
157. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000).

158. See Robert L. Mullen, The Americans With DisabilitiesAct: An Introduction for Lawyers
and Judges. 29 LAND & WATER L. REV. 175 (1994).

In a real sense ...[the ADA] is an affirmative action law ... in that compliance with
the ADA is not to be passively achieved .... [Slpecific, legally enforceable responsibilities are created for both public and private parties in order to help bring about a much
greater level of participation by people with disabilities within all facets of American
society.
Id. at 180. The onus is clearly on the employer to show compliance with the law.
159. White, supra note 28, at 1046.
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the presumption in favor of mainstreaming is wholly inconsistent with
this policy-preference, which is reflected not only in IDEA, but also in
other similar, remedial federal statutes.
D.

Fairness

Fairness dictates that the mainstreaming presumption should be vigorously safeguarded. When one party possesses superior knowledge,
fairness may require that the burden of proof must be allocated to
that party. 160 In special education placement challenges where mainstreaming is impossible, the school district is the only party that has
evidence to prove it.161 Consequently, the school district may fairly be
expected to advance some evidence to support its position that mainstreaming cannot work. If such evidence is not introduced, a proper
inference may be made that the school district opposes mainstreaming, not because the placement is inappropriate, but because main162
streaming does not fit the school's own interests.
In Schaffer, the Fourth Circuit rejected the argument that school
districts possess superior knowledge in IDEA due process challenges,
pointing to IDEA provisions that require schools to grant parents access to academic information. 163 As Leahy and Mugmon pointed out,
however, this rationale fails on two important counts: First, it ignores
the fact that, "despite their experience with their own child, parents
lack a comprehensive understanding of the cumulative, institutional
knowledge gained by representatives of the school district from their
experiences with other similarly disabled children"; 164 and second, the
argument fails to recognize that parents often lack the sophistication
to interpret education records, even if they have full access to such
records. 165 Leahy and Mugmon noted that, "the access to information
provided by the IDEA does not necessarily have any correlation to
166
parents' abilities to use that information productively."'
160. Leahy & Mugmon, supra note 12, at 963 (citing NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d
170, 176 (2d Cir. 1965) (allocating the burden of proof to the party who controls the relevant
information needed to decide the dispute)).
161. Weber, supra note 14, at 45 ("The presumption should lie against the side with the better
ability to disprove the proposition. Obviously, that is the school in the situation of a contest over
the placement of a child with a disability.").
162. Id.

163. Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 2004).
164. Leahy & Mugmon, supra note 12, at 964 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Weast, 377 F.3d at 458 (Luttig, J., dissenting)).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 964-65 (citing NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170, 176 (2d. Cir. 1965)
(stating that access to evidence alone does not determine the assignment of the burden of proof;
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In reality, parents mounting due process challenges typically occupy
an inferior bargaining position to school officials. Many due process
challenges look more like David and Goliath matches than genuine
attempts to arbitrate disputes.1 67 There are many reasons why this
may be so. First, although IDEA mandates parental access to all of
the child's educational records and evaluations prior to the due process hearing168-the provision that persuaded the Schaffer courtthese provisions are in no way equivalent to the rigorous discovery
requirements in civil litigation. 1 69 The school controls the records and
witnesses needed for the parents' case. 170 The person most familiar
with a disabled child's educational progress and most qualified to
speak at these hearings is often the child's teacher, an employee of the
71
adverse party.'
Schools also possess a level of expertise on academic affairs that
parents often do not. 1 72 Unlike parents, schools have the benefit of
interacting with a cross-section of students for extended periods of
time. This perspective is incredibly useful in substantive due process
173
challenges involving education services.
More importantly, initiating and sustaining a special education due
process challenge can require significant financial resources. 174 The
attorneys and experts necessary to parents' cases often charge exorbitant fees. This barrier is mitigated only slightly by IDEA provisions
that compensate prevailing parents for their attorney expenses and
require school districts to inform parents of low-cost legal service
providers.' 75 In addition, the sheer length of the process often deters
parents from initiating or sustaining challenges.1 76 Working parents
may not have the time necessary to devote to this process, so they are
the court must also consider which party has the ability to explain the records and interpret any
ambiguities they may contain)).
167. See id. at 952.
168. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) (2000).
169. Anne E. Johnson. Note, Evening the Playing Field: Tailoringthe Allocation of the Burden
of Proof at IDEA Due Process Hearings to Balance Children's Rights and Schools' Needs, 46
B.C. L. REV. 591, 619 (2005).
170. Id. at 619-20 (providing an extensive and useful overview of the competing considerations courts must weigh in allocating burdens under due process challenges).
171. Id. at 619.
172. Id. at 619-20.
173. See id.
174. Id. at 620.
175. Id.; 20 U.S.C § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2000). See also Jonathan A. Beyer, A Modest Proposal:
Mediating IDEA Disputes Without Splitting the Baby, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 37, 41-43 (1999) (outlining various reasons why parents may experience difficulty in winning IDEA disputes).
176. See Johnson, supra note 169, at 620.
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forced to either choose not to engage in it or mount challenges that
177
are easily defeated by savvy school legal teams.
Finally, parents face emotional and social pressures that might deter
them from challenging a school district's educational placement decision.17 8 Particularly in smaller school districts, parents may be reluctant to challenge educators with whom they have worked and with
whom they frequently interact outside of hearings. 179 Parents challenging a placement may receive backlash not only from school officials, but also from others in the community who believe that they are
requesting preferential treatment for their children.' 8 0 In general,
school district officials assume that parents cannot objectively determine what services are appropriate for their children, and parents labor under the impression that school district officials are not
interested in parental participation or will limit parental participation
with sophisticated legal maneuvers."8"
Given these obstacles, parents who exercise their due process rights
often fare poorly. One study in Illinois reported that, over a five-year
period, hearing officers granted parents' requests in only 30.5% of due
process hearings.18 2 While school districts retained attorneys in 94%
of cases, parents retained representation in only 44% of cases.' 83 In
177. See Rebecca Weber Goldman, Comment, A Free Appropriate Education in the Least
Restrictive Environment: Promises Made, Promises Broken by the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, 20 U. DAYTON L. REv. 243, 281-82 (1994).
178. See Johnson, supra note 169, at 620.
179. Id.
180. Jay P. Heubert, Schools Without Rules? CharterSchools, FederalDisability Law, and the
Paradoxesof DeRegulation, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 301, 311-12 (1997).
181. See Johnson, supra note 169, at 620; see also Stephen C. Shannon, Note, The Individuals
With Disabilities Education Act: Determining "Appropriate Relief' in a Post-Gwinnett Era, 85
VA. L. REV. 853 (1999).

[S]tudies indicate that educators tend to focus on a child's weaknesses and faults as a
way of coercing parental compliance with the school personnel's recommendation.
Others observe that school personnel do not allow parents to give constructive input on
their child's needs or simply do not incorporate parents' input into an [individualized
education program] recommendation. Parents report that school officials tend to
blame them for their child's problems, particularly when the nature of the child's disability is undetermined. Several studies note the extensive use of educational and medical terminology that accompany [individualized education program] meetings, which
often has the effect of excluding parents from the dialogue.
Id. at 879. These tactics operate as a formidable barrier for parents who might otherwise welcome the opportunity to actively participate in the individualized education program process.
182. Melanie Archer, Access and Equity in the Due Process System: Attorney Representation
and Hearing Outcomes in Illinois, 1997-2002, at 4-7 (Dec. 2002), available at http://www.geo
cities.com/fishstep/Archer.html (providing an overview of due process statistics in Illinois, demonstrating that parents occupy uneven ground in due process challenges).
183. Id. at 6.
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light of such statistics, it is clear that the playing field is not level for
parents dissatisfied with their child's education.
IV.

IMPACT

Presumptions are appropriate "when policy demands it, when inability to obtain access to evidence justifies it, or when the proposition
is more probably correct in the run of litigated cases." 184 As the previous Part demonstrated, the mainstreaming presumption meets each of
these criteria. The most recent revision of IDEA, 18 5 however, failed
to clarify an important issue: how the mainstreaming presumption is
to be preserved in a judicial environment that defers to the wisdom of
school districts on most education decisions. Absent clarification, the
result may further splinter jurisdictions interpreting IDEA and dilute
IDEA's fundamental focus: the integration of disabled children, a historically marginalized population, into general education classrooms.
This Part begins by predicting that, absent further clarification by
Congress or the Supreme Court, circuit courts will continue to split on
how they assess least restrictive environment challenges to existing individualized education programs.' 86 As a result, courts will likely err
on the side of deference to school districts.' 87 Finally, this Part discusses over-identification of minority students in special education
services and predicts that, without clarification of the presumption,
segregation of students along racial lines may continue. 188
A.

Incongruity in IDEA Cases

The Supreme Court's decision in Schaffer will likely have one of
two effects on IDEA interpretation. Courts may either continue to
distinguish between challenges to placement and challenges to other
parts of an individualized education program, or they may view Schaffer as dispositive on all individualized education program challenges
and afford the mainstreaming presumption no evidentiary weight.
Absent further Congressional or Supreme Court clarification, the
latter outcome is more likely. Courts may view the least restrictive
environment presumption as inconsistent with the burden of proof allocation in cases where a school district opposes mainstreaming. A
Sixth Circuit case decided before Schaffer suggested that courts want
184.
185.
U.S.C.
186.
187.
188.

Weber, supra note 14, at 44.
Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20
§§ 1400-1482 (2000)).
See infra notes 189-190 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 191-200 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 201-208 and accompanying text.
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guidance on this issue. 18 9 That court noted that "[a]bsent more definitive authorization [from the Congress or the Supreme Court] ... we
decline ... to reverse the traditional burden of proof."' 90 Schaffer
provided the definitive authorization requested by the Sixth Circuit.
Following that decision, even those courts that originally ignored the
Rowley presumption-a presumption in favor of the school districton placement challenges will likely view their position as inconsistent
with Supreme Court precedent. Although Schaffer did not specifically
deal with a placement challenge, courts may construe it to apply in
that circumstance.
B.

Undue Deference to School Districts

Support for full inclusion of learning-disabled students is far from
universal, even among special education advocates. 191 For example,
the Learning Disabilities Association of America supports segregation
for students when the decision is made in accordance with a continuum of placements analysis. 192 Teachers unions are similarly skeptical
of blanket, full-inclusion policies. The American Federation of Teachers has called for a moratorium on placement of disabled students in
regular classrooms until further research supports the notion that such
placements work. 193 Over three-fourths of teachers polled by the
1 94
American Federation of Teachers opposed full-inclusion policies.
The National Education Association takes "a more moderate stance,"
supporting full-inclusion policies only when schools properly train
95
teachers and provide them with necessary resources.1
In contrast to the lack of support for inclusion voiced by special
education advocacy groups and teachers unions, school districts often
vocally oppose full-inclusion policies based on fiscal concerns. 196 Regular education placements require appropriate support services that
some school districts are unable to fund. 197 "Moreover, some state
funding systems tie state special education allocations to the location
where services are provided, thus furnishing incentives for restrictive
189. Cordrey v. Euckert, 917 F.2d 1460, 1466 (6th Cir. 1990).
190. Id.
191. Martha M. McCarthy, Inclusion of Children With Disabilities: Is it Required?, 95 WEST'S
EDUC. L. REP. 823, 830 (1995).

192. Id. Conversely, the Council for Exceptional Children supports blanket inclusion of children with disabilities in neighborhood schools. Id.
193. Id. at 830.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 831.
197. McCarthy, supra note 191, at 831.
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placements."'' 98 Such state fiscal arrangements provide incentive for
exclusion. 199
Without a strong presumption for mainstreaming, courts are likely
to defer to educators and school administrators. This outcome is particularly likely given the disparity in information access between parents and school administrators.2 0 0 Any school district that can set
forth a reasonable explanation for segregation-ranging from limited
financial resources to academic strategies-will likely find the court
sympathetic to its oversight.
C. Impact on the Minority Student Population
Minorities present special difficulty in special education placements.
Recent studies have shown that minorities are over-identified by
school officials as learning-disabled. 20 1 Such data are relatively scant,
because states were not required to aggregate special education data
by race and ethnicity before the 1997 IDEA reauthorization. 20 2 This
pattern has grave implications for minority students. The number of
non-English-speaking students entering schools is rising. Between
2000 and 2003, "[n]ineteen states .. .reported an increase of more
than 50 percent in English language learners. '20 3 Schools may find it
increasingly difficult to distinguish between learning delays related to
language barriers and learning disabilities that require special education classification. Teachers may believe that they are unable to either
accommodate these students or properly diagnose them. Consequently, they may over-enroll non-English-speaking students in segre20 4
gated classrooms under the care of special education instructors.
English-speaking minorities are also over-identified as special education students. 20 5 The idea that such over-identification is the result
of any invidious segregation effort on the part of school officials is
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See supra notes 167-83 and accompanying text.
201. NAT'L CTR. FOR LEARNING DISABILITIES, MINORITY

STUDENTS IN SPECIAL EDUCATION:

DISPROPORTIONALITY AND LEARNING DISABILITIES (LD), available at http://www.ncld.org (last

visited July 17, 2007).
202. See Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (codified in 20 U.S.C. § 6311(h)(1)(C), 6311(h)(2)(B)
(2000)).
203. U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., RESOURCES PLUS REFORMS EQUALS RESULTS, http://www.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ods/resources-reform/index.html (last visited July 17, 2007).
204. For a comprehensive overview of the phenomenon of over-identification of minority students in special education programs, see generally Jordan L. Wilson, Note, Missing the Big
IDEA: The Supreme Court Loses Sight of the Policy Behind the Individuals With Disabilities
Education Act in Schaffer v. Weast, 44 Hous. L. REV. 161, 183-86 (2007).
205. NAT'L CTR. FOR LEARNING DISABILITIES, supra note 201.
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beyond the scope of this Comment; however, over-identification as
learning-disabled and exclusion from mainstreamed classrooms go
hand-in-hand. Learning disabilities can be, in part, products of social
construction. 20 6 For example, minority students who are learning
delayed as a result of any number of factors known to impact cognitive development-such as poverty and absent parents 2 7-may be
placed in segregated classrooms where they languish, developing a
'20 8
kind of "learned helplessness.
V.

CONCLUSION

The importance of the judicial enforcement of IDEA's mainstream20 9
ing requirement is underscored by the many barriers to inclusion.
"[C]ourts have the crucial responsibility to scrutinize school district
findings and conclusions" that effectuate the exclusion of learning-disabled children from regular education classrooms. 210 Unfortunately,
the Supreme Court's decision in Schaffer relieves courts of this obligation, instead deferring to school districts without proper attention to
either Congress's legislative intent or the multitude of reasons, other
than the individual interests of the child, that a school district might
have for urging segregated placements for learning-disabled students.
In future IDEA reauthorizations, Congress should clarify the least
restrictive environment presumption if it is to be effective. An effective presumption in favor of mainstreaming should require school districts to defend, on its merits, any individualized education program
that removes a disabled child from the general student population.
Only by giving that presumption teeth can IDEA's fundamental purpose be realized. "It is the vision of special education as something
not all that special .... The vision ... of children with disabilities...
mixed in with other children, without any stigma imposed on those
who learn in different ways or with additional support. ' 21 1
Jennifer M. Saba *
206. Tami Vollmar, Laying a Foundationfor a Better Understanding of Learning Disabilities,
http://www.msu.edu/user/vollmart/docs/LDResearchBrief.pdf (last visited July 17, 2007).
207. SPECIAL EDUCATION NEWS, POVERTY AND DISABILITY: Two STRIKES AGAINST?, (Mar.
12, 2000), http://www.specialednews.com/disabilities/disabnews/povanddisab03l200.html.
208. See ETHNIC MINORITY EMPOWERMENT, available at http://jan.ucc.nau.edu/-jar/Cummins.

html (last visited July 17, 2007).
209. Daniel H. Melvin II, Comment, The Desegregation of Children With Disabilities, 44
DEPAUL L. REV. 599, 668 (1995).
210. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
211. Weber, supra note 14, at 51.
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